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Reconstructing the World Trade Center: An
Argument for the Applicability of
Personhood Theory to Commercial Property
Ownership and Use
Mary L. Clark*
This essay highlights two critical understandings gained from
examining the rise, fall, and subsequent reconstruction of the World
Trade Center through the lens of personhood theory: (1) that
proponents of personhood theory have failed to appreciate the
significant potential for self-constitution and self-expression
contained within commercial property ownership and use; and
(2) that the post-9/J1 decision to leave undeveloped the
'footprinted" land underlying the original World Trade Center
towers represents a decommodification (withdrawal from market) of
some of the most valuable real estate in the world in explicit
recognition of the personhood attachments of those who died there
that day.
I. Introduction
This essay looks to Margaret Jane Radin's "property for
personhood" theory as a vehicle for understanding the rise, fall, and
reconstruction of the World Trade Center. Nearly exclusively applied to
non-commercial property, Radin's personhood theory has tremendous,
untapped relevance for commercial property ownership and use, as the
following discussion of the World Trade Center development and
redevelopment makes clear.1  Among other insights generated by
* Visiting Associate Professor, American University Washington College of Law;
J.D. Harvard Law School; A.B. Bryn Mawr College.
1. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957
(1982) (articulating personhood theory); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100
HARV. L. REv. 1849 (1987) (articulating critique of universal commodification); see also
Margaret Jane Radin, The Colin Ruagh Thomas O'Fallon Memorial Lecture on
Reconsidering Personhood, 74 OR. L. REV. 423, 428-29 (1995) ("updating" her
personhood theory).
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applying personhood theory to the commercial property realm are:
(1) recognition that commercial property ownership and use can
significantly impact the self-constitution and self-expression of
individuals in a way that richly promotes human flourishing, one of
Radin's central concerns for property; and (2) that the post-9/11
decommodification of the "footprinted" land underlying the original
World Trade Center towers (i.e., its complete withdrawal from the
commercial real estate market for use as a memorial), was done in
widespread recognition of the personhood attachments to the site of the
nearly 3,000 people who died there on September 11, 2001.
This essay begins by highlighting the nearly complete failure of
personhood theory-in the twenty-plus years since its first articulation
by Radin-to address its applicability to commercial property ownership
and use.2  After exploring the potentially significant impact of
commercial property ownership and use on self-constitution and
expression, this essay concludes by examining how one aspect of
property law, specifically eminent domain, could be modified to account
for the personhood implications of commercial property.
II. Radin's Personhood Theory
In her trailblazing article, "Property and Personhood,' '3 Radin
speaks of property as distributed along a continuum, from that which is
purely fungible (i.e., held for its instrumental value and readily
replaceable), such as stock certificates, to that which is principally
sentimental and irreplaceable, such as photos of loved ones. Radin
termed this latter category "personhood property" in recognition of the
role these classes of things play in our self-constitution and expression.
For Radin, "[p]ersonal property is important precisely because its holder
could not be the particular person she is without it."4 Drawing heavily
on Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's personality theory in arguing that
personhood property is that which is centrally formative of the self,
Radin asserts that individuals realize their true selves "only by engaging
in a property relationship with something external. Such a relationship is
the goal of the person."5  Thus, according to Radin (and Hegel),
"property is the first embodiment of freedom.' 6
2. In addition to highlighting the failure of Radin's writings to address the
personhood implications of commercial property ownership and use, I note the nearly
complete failure of those responding to Radin's personhood theory-supporters as well
as detractors-to fully address its applicability in the commercial property realm.
3. See supra note 1.
4. Radin, supra note 1, at 972 (attributing idea to Hegel).
5. Id. at 972-73.
6. Id. (quoting Hegel).
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Radin grounds her personhood theory on an intuitive understanding
that different items of property have different degrees of impact on an
individual's self-identity.7 Radin's intuition, grounded in observation of
fact, is that:
Most people possess certain objects they feel are almost part of
themselves. These objects are closely bound up with personhood
because they are part of the way we constitute ourselves as
continuing personal entities in the world. They may be as different as
people are different, but some common examples might be a wedding
ring, a portrait, an heirloom, or a house.
8
According to Radin, we can measure the degree of an individual's
identification with an item of property by anticipating the extent of
personal loss that would be suffered upon its removal. "On this view, an
object is closely related to one's personhood if its loss causes pain that
cannot be relieved by the object's replacement. If so, that particular
object is bound up with the holder." 9 Using a wedding ring as an
example, Radin observes that if it is "stolen from a jeweler, insurance
proceeds can reimburse the jeweler, but if a wedding ring is stolen from a
loving wearer, the price of a replacement will not restore the status
quo-perhaps no amount of money can do so. ''W
Radin contrasts the self-constitutive character of personhood
property with that which is held merely instrumentally. For Radin, it is a
distinction between that which is valued for having and holding and that
which is valued for buying and selling: "The opposite of holding an
object that has become a part of oneself is holding an object that is
perfectly replaceable with other goods of equal market value. One holds
such an object for purely instrumental reasons." According to Radin:
"The archetype of such a good is, of course, money, which is almost
always held only to buy other things. A dollar is worth no more than
what one chooses to buy with it, and one dollar bill is as good as
another."" Money in the hands of a currency collector would, of course,
be an exception to this rule, but other examples of items held purely
instrumentally would be "land in the hands of the developer, or the
apartment in the hands of the commercial landlord.''
2
By contrast with these examples of instrumental property, the
paradigm of personhood property for Radin is the family home, the site
7. Margaret Jane Radin, Lacking a Transformative Social Theory: A Response, 45
STAN. L. REV. 409 (1993) (reflecting on "Propertj and Personhood").
8. Radin, supra note 1, at 959.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 959-60.
12. Id.
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of primary human attachment and identity, and the foundation of
personal stability, security, and growth. With specific attention to the
home, Radin declares: "Once we admit that a person can be bound up
with an external 'thing' in some constitutive sense .... we can argue that,
by virtue of this connection, the person should be accorded broad liberty
with respect to control over that 'thing.""'l 3 Two immediate implications
of this recognition are, first, an understanding of the fundamentally
destabilizing, individually violative nature of home burglary, and second,
an argument that the home should be immune from the government's
exercise of eminent domain authority, to which we will return in a
moment.
While acknowledging that not all personal property (i.e., books and
clothes), is personhood property, Radin fails to acknowledge that some
personal property may be held principally instrumentally, 14 and that
some commercial property involves important personhood concerns, i.e.,
that not all commercial property is merely fungible.15 To her credit,
Radin acknowledges that a factory owner may derive personhood value
from his or her equipment holdings, noting, "[p]erhaps the entrepreneur
factory owner has ownership of a particular factory and its machines
bound up with her being to some degree."' 6  However, Radin
acknowledges this only in passing. After discounting the personhood
potential with use of "perhaps" and "to some degree," she says nothing
more of the entrepreneurial factory owner.1 7 The commercial property
13. Id. at 960-61.
14. See, e.g., Jeanne Lorraine Schroeder, Virgin Territory: Margaret Radin's
Imagery of Personal Property as Inviolate Feminine Body, 79 MINN. L. REv. 55, 105
(1994) (asserting, "I would venture that many people actually identify their personhood
partly in terms of economic behavior.").
15. Radin, supra note 1, at 960 n.6. On a related note, Schroeder criticizes Radin for
failing to recognize that the loss of instrumentally held property might occasion a feeling
of personal loss. See Schroeder, supra note 14, at 109 (noting, "Radin concentrates on
the loss of self that people feel when they lose control over their bodies or other intimate
objects that are tied to their personalities. It does not follow from this that people do not
feel loss of self when they lose control over objects they hold solely for instrumental
purposes."); see also id. at 110 (declaring, "if we seriously consider the role of property
in human freedom, we should account for the subjective experience of empowerment and
satisfaction owners have in controlling fungible property and the feelings of pain they
experience at the loss of control.").
16. Radin, supra note 1, at 987.
17. Id. Radin likewise discounts the personhood potential of commercial property
ownership in her other writings. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception
of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667,
1689-90 (1988): "Use of property as one's residence is more closely connected to
personhood than use of property as a garbage dump for one's factory.... Airplane
overflight noise 'takes' much more from a (hearing) resident than from a (hearing)
proprietor who already operates a noisy manufacturing business or from a (nonhearing)
corporation. A cable on the roof of a building the owner rents out as a fungible
[Vol. 109:3
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owner is simply not material to Radin's concerns.
Thereafter, Radin acknowledges that "[w]hile I have argued that
personal property should be specially recognized, I do not argue that
there is no personhood interest even in fungible property."'18  Having
acknowledged this, Radin nevertheless discounts the personhood value
of commercial property by insisting that "[i]t is important to realize that
in a larger scheme that accords special recognition to core personhood
interests in general, some personhood interests not embodied in property
will take precedence over claims to fungible property."'19 Thus, Radin
suggests that even non-propertied personhood interests trump fungible
property interests, defined largely in terms of commercial property
interests. In so doing, Radin fails to give nuanced recognition to the
potential personhood implications of commercial property ownership and
use.
20
Radin's failure to adequately acknowledge the often-significant
personhood potential of commercial property ownership and use is a
critical shortcoming of her writing.2
investment no more invades her personhood than does a utility assessment. In this
visionary interpretation, we would forthrightly declare Loretto's reasoning.. . to be
wrong.... Thus, labor regulation (such as collective bargaining, minimum wage,
maximum hours, health and safety and unemployment insurance).., can be seen as an
effort to foster workers' and tenants' personhood by recognizing the nonmarket personal
significance of their work and homes. Such regulations need not be seen as takings....
Such legislation should not be thought of as a taking, because the corporation's property
is fungible. The corporation as a profit-maximizing entity should ethically be treated as
indifferent between holding assets with fair market value of X dollars and possessing X
dollars in currency or securities. Government action that required resident homeowners
to sell to a corporation, on the other hand, might be considered a taking or a violation of
substantive due process."
18. Radin, supra note 1, at 1008.
19. Id.
20. See Schroeder, supra note 14, at 81 (observing, "[Radin] does not... discuss
which object relations to fungible property should appropriately be given legal
recognition. Indeed, given that she defines 'fungible property' as 'commodification,' it is
hard to see what affirmative relation Radin thinks one could have to one's fungible
property, other than the non-relation of indifference.").
21. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 17, at 1695 n.122 (declaring, "I believe there is a
strong case for treating corporate property as fungible."). See generally Robert G.
Natelson, Consent, Coercion, and 'Reasonableness' in Private Law: The Special Case of
the Pronerty Owners Association, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 41 n.162 (1990) (noting, "[t]he
importance of some business property to personhood seems to have passed unnoticed by
many scholars, as is suggested by the economic term 'consumer surplus' to describe
value beyond market or instrumental value. Perhaps scholars overlook the personhood
aspect of business enterprises because few of them have had entrepreneurial experience.
Certainly anyone who has been a business owner for a significant length of time is deeply
aware of the profound connection between business expression and personhood.").
2005]
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II. Normative Implications of Radin's Personhood Theory
Having articulated a "sliding scale" of property from the merely
fungible to the irreplaceable, Radin then calls for greater legal protection
of the latter than the former. As Radin puts it, "[t]o the extent these
theories are normative, the claim is that some property is worthier of
protection than other property. 22  More specifically, "the personhood
perspective can ... serve as an explicit source of values for making
moral distinctions in property disputes, and hence for either justifying or
criticizing current law." 23  For Radin, personhood theory has broad
potential for reconfiguring property doctrine through attention to
property's impacts on self-constitution and self-expression.
With these normative concerns in mind, Radin overlays her
personhood to fungible property continuum with a hierarchy of legal
entitlements and protection, such that that which is most closely
identified with personhood is given the greatest legal solicitude, and that
which is most closely identified with the purely fungible is given the
least solicitude.24 According to Radin, "those rights near one end of the
continuum-fungible property rights-can be overridden in some cases
in which those near the other-personal property rights-cannot be."25
One area of direct applicability for Radin's personhood theory is
eminent domain law, the governmental authority to condemn property.
Because Radin advocates greatest legal solicitude for property that is
centrally constitutive of self, she argues that the family home should be
immune from eminent domain actions. By contrast, Radin understands
the condemnation of commercial property as fully redressable with cash
because no personhood attachments are at stake.26
Noting that the law of eminent domain and regulatory takings was
"the most difficult, yet most promising area for applying the personhood
dichotomy,, 27 Radin asserts that the family home should be accorded
special legal solicitude vis-A-vis eminent domain because of the
centrality of individuals' attachments to the home. As a result, there
should be no condemnation, or condemnation only under circumstances
of strict necessity, where proof of compelling state interest and least
22. Radin, supra note 1, at 979.
23. Id. at 957.
24. Unsurprisingly, critics of Radin's personhood theory object that it is not self-
evident that personhood property is deserving of greater legal solicitude than fungible
property. See, e.g., Neil Duxbury, Law, Markets, and Valuation, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 657,
667-68 (1995) (stating, "[s]till more questionable is Raain's assumption that, generally
speaking, rights in personal property have a greater value and therefore deserve greater
legal protection than rights in fungible property.").
25. Id.
26. Radin, supra note 17, at 1685-87.
27. Radin, supra note 1, at 1002.
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intrusive alternative is made.28
Recognition of, or deference to, personhood attachments to property
has not been forthcoming in either eminent domain or regulatory takings
law. In attempting to explain this failing, Radin suggests that the law
may be considered ill-equipped to measure the degree of an individual's
identification with his or her home and other property centrally
constitutive of the self: "[P]erhaps we are unwilling to presume that all
single-family homes are personal because many houses are held only for
investment, and a subjective inquiry into each case slows down
government too much., 29 Alternatively, Radin suggests that the law may
be thought to have already accounted for personhood attachments in
determining which properties to condemn: "[P]erhaps the personhood
perspective is so deeply embedded that, without focusing on the problem,
we expect that the condemning authority will take fungible property
where possible. 3 °  Ultimately, Radin confesses, "the fact that the
personhood perspective has not surfaced to give some explicit protection
to family homes from government taking, such as stricter scrutiny,
[is] ... anomalous. 31  Likewise anomalous is the law's failure to
recognize the potential for personhood attachments to commercial
property ownership and use, a context both under-recognized and under-
theorized, to which I now turn.
IV. Personhood Implications of Commercial Property Ownership and
Use
Commercial property interests, whether large or small, can have
significant implications for self-constitution and expression. Quite
literally, for many their worksite becomes their "home away from
home," where individuals decorate their worksites with much the same
paraphernalia as their homes, including photos of loved ones, music
players, artwork, etc.
Moreover, a business may well be the product of individual blood,
sweat, and tears, i.e., of personhood investment. It may also be a site of
shared work with a spouse, parents, children, siblings, or other family
members, as is so common with comer stores and other family-owned
28. Id. at 1005-06 (reasoning: "If the personhood perspective is expressed in law,
one might expect to find an implied limitation on the eminent domain power. That is,
one might expect to find that a special class of property like a family home is protected
against the government by a 'property rule' and not just a 'liability rule.' Or one might
expect to find that a special class of property is protected against taking unless the
government shows a 'compelling state interest' and that taking it is the 'least intrusive
alternative."').
29. Id.
30. Radin, supra note 1, at 1005-06.
31. Id.
2005]
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businesses. Business property may be inherited from family, or the
entrepreneurial business owner may anticipate leaving his or her property
as a legacy to children or grandchildren. Indeed, anticipation of leaving
one's business as a legacy resonates with Radin's emphasis, derived
from Hegel, on the importance of experiencing human connectivity
through attachment to property-particularly to property that has
belonged, and will belong, to others. In other words, to see oneself as a
member of a larger humanity through identification with property that
has a lifespan greater than one's own.
Anticipation of leaving commercial property as a legacy to one's
heirs also resonates with Radin's and Hegel's emphasis on realizing
individual aspirations through property ownership and use. Radin writes:
If an object you now control is bound up in your future plans or in
your anticipation of your future self, and it is partly these plans for
your own continuity that make you a person, then your personhood
depends on the realization of these expectations.
32
This emphasis on the personhood implications of realizing personal goals
through property is no less true of commercial property than personal
property, and should be recognized by the law as playing a critical role in
both realms.
V. Applying Personhood Theory to the World Trade Center Site
Radin's personhood theory applies with particular force to the
World Trade Center in both its original development and current
redevelopment.
A. Clearing the Way for the Original Development
The sixteen-acre World Trade Center parcel was earmarked for
large-scale commercial development in the face of vocal opposition from
a band of small electronics store owners whose properties the Port
Authority sought to condemn for office towers devoted to "world
trade. 33  In an effort to stave off the bulldozers, the "Radio Row"
business owners marched through their neighborhood with a coffin
labeled "Here Lies Mr. Small Businessman; Don't Let the Port Authority
Bury Him." 34 One can hardly imagine a better demonstration of the
personhood implications of commercial property ownership than
32. Id. at 968.
33. Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 190 N.E.2d 402 (N.Y. 1963),
appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 (1963).
34. JAMES GLANZ & ERIC LIPTON, CITY IN THE SKY: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
WORLD TRADE CENTER 210 (Times Books 2003).
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depicting the property's condemnation as the death of the self.
The Radio Row business owners went on to confront then-New
York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, a leading proponent of the World
Trade Center project, with angry protests underscoring the dire impact of
the condemnation on the well-being of their wives and children. By
employing their families as "props," the business owners tapped into
powerful personhood rhetoric to defend their commercial property
interests. These examples of the Radio Row owners' responses
challenge Radin's uncritical assertion that money is sufficient to redress
condemnation of commercial property in all circumstances.
In contrast to the powerful personhood rhetoric drawn on by the
Radio Row entrepreneurs, the Empire State Building owner's challenge
to the World Trade Center project never engendered the same type of
public sympathy because it did not tap into forces of personhood
attachment. Lawrence A. Wien, the then-owner of the Empire State
Building, saw the proposed World Trade Center project as a threat to his
building's status as the world's tallest and feared the impact this threat
would have on his ability to command premium rents from commercial
tenants. Running a full-page ad in the New York Times under the
moniker, "Committee for a Reasonable World Trade Center," Wien drew
on fears for the public's safety by depicting a lost jetliner crashing into
the top floors of the twin towers. 5
Ask New Yorkers who lived through the development of the
original World Trade Center project whether they recall the Radio Row
or Lawrence Wien protests, and they will cite the former, providing
crucial information on the saliency of personhood theory in the
commercial context.
B. Today's Redevelopment
Radin's personhood concerns likewise apply to today's
redevelopment. After considering the personhood implications, if any,
for Larry Silverstein, the long-term leaseholder to the World Trade
Center, I show how the personhood attachments of those who died in the
attacks have been embraced through the commitment not to rebuild on
the land immediately underlying the original towers.
1. Potential Personhood Implications for World Trade Center
Leaseholder Larry Silverstein
Whether legally recognized personhood implications arise from
Silverstein's leasehold interest in the World Trade Center turns on what
35. Id. (as a military aircraft had earlier done with the Empire State Building).
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types of personhood interests we believe the law should encourage;
specifically, whether the law should recognize ego and ambition as types
of motivation or attachments to property deserving of legal protection
under a personhood rubric. That the law should encourage more benign
personhood attachments-to family, friends, and colleagues-should be
uncontroversial. But whether the law should recognize or encourage ego
and ambition is another matter; again, not one well addressed by Radin,
though anticipated, at least in part, by her reference to the "compleat
capitalist," which I take up below.
Having followed his father into real estate as a young man,
Silverstein subsequently brought his own son and daughter into business
with him. Silverstein's real estate business is thus a family business,
connecting generations past and present. Silverstein may well plan to
leave his business as his legacy to his children and/or grandchildren,
consistent with Radin's and Hegel's emphasis on experiencing human
connectivity through attachment to property.
36
Having spent his life in real estate, Silverstein's property holdings
are the primary locus of his identity, where the press regularly refers to
him as "real estate developer Larry Silverstein." 37  Under Radin's
personhood framework, Silverstein is centrally constituted by property-
it has quite literally made him who he is.
What is not so unquestionably accepted as a personhood attachment
to be recognized or encouraged under the law is Silverstein's ego
investment in the World Trade Center property, exemplified by his plans
to erect the world's tallest tower, the so-called "Freedom Tower," on that
site. It bears noting, of course, that Silverstein is not fully in control of
the contours of the World Trade Center redevelopment. As a
leaseholder, Silverstein must work with the Port Authority, as landowner,
to develop the site. Silverstein and the Port Authority must in turn
collaborate with a range of other parties to address the interests of all
stakeholders, among them, the families of those who died in the attacks,
those who live and work in the neighborhood, and the public. It goes
almost without saying that the site has also become the focal point for
intense nationalist yearnings, which cannot be discounted in shaping the
site's redevelopment, including the impulse toward construction of
36. In a related manner, Silverstein has also spoken of his commitment to rebuild the
World Trade Center in terms of the legacy that he, now approaching his mid-seventies,
wishes to leave New York. He also speaks of his loss of several employees in the
September 1 lth attacks as undergirding his commitment to redevelop the site.
37. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, A Mayoral Hand Helps Smaller Nonprofits Reach
Into Deep Pockets, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2004, at B 1; Rebuilding Lower Manhattan, N.Y.
TIMES, May 6, 2004, at A34.
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Freedom Tower, with groundbreaking on the Fourth of July, 2004.38
Ego is, of course, a central element-if not the central element-of
personhood. One need look no further than to Freud's writings for this
proposition.39 Radin would likely classify Silverstein's ego-investment
as "bad object relations" 40 to which minimal, if any, legal solicitude
should be accorded. In this regard, Radin repeatedly invokes the
caricature of the "compleat capitalist," driven by material self-interest, as
a complete failure of human flourishing. 4' Radin posits a distinction
between good and bad object relations in her personhood writings,
ascribing bad object relations to the compleat capitalist, whose property
attachments, she argues, should not be given legal solicitude:
[A]rguably there is bad as well as good in being bound up with
external objects. If there is a traditional understanding that a well-
developed person must invest herself to some extent in external
objects, there is no less a traditional understanding that one should
not invest oneself in the wrong way or to too great an extent in
external objects.42
Bad object relations represent the opposite of healthful property
attachments for Radin. The former do not lead to secure, stable personal
growth while the latter do. Radin accordingly asserts: "[T]he
relationship between the shoe fetishist and his shoe will not be respected
like that between the spouse and her wedding ring. At the extreme,
anyone who lives only for material objects is considered not to be a well-
developed person, but rather to be lacking some important attribute of
humanity. 43 Thus, Radin concludes, "[p]roperty is damnation as well as
38. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDBERGER, UP FROM ZERO: POLITICS, ARCHITECTURE AND THE
REBUILDING OF NEW YORK (Random House 2004).
39. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID 8 (James Strachey, ed., 1990).
40. Radin, supra note 1, at 968.
41. See Radin, supra note 17, at 1694-95 (asserting that the "compleat capitalist"
holds a relationship with property that we as a society should reject). Elsewhere, Radin
explains the defect of the "compleat capitalist" as one of failed human flourishing: "The
empire of the 'compleat capitalist' . . . might contribute to her continuity and to her own
sense of fulfillment, but it would not contribute to her being a well-developed person, for
the 'compleat capitalist' is not well-developed; she has embraced an inferior concept of
human flourishing." Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 350, 365 (1986).
42. Radin, supra note 1, at 961.
43. Id. Not only might Radin question the bad object relations of Silverstein's ego-
aggrandizement in seeking to erect the world's tallest building, but Radin would likely
consider his leasehold interest quintessentially fungible. The July 2001 World Trade
Center lease grants Silverstein an interest in "all that certain volume of space occupied by
the Building and any replacements thereof." (Lease on file with the author).
Silverstein's interest in the ten million square feet of office space contained within the
original towers has been treated as inviolate in its volume but necessarily flexible in its
allocation post-9/1 1, where the ten million square feet is intended to be distributed among
2005]
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salvation, object-fetishism as well as moral groundwork." 4
Radin is correct that rights in fetishized property-such as Imelda
Marcos's shoe collection, or Michael Jackson's Neverland estate-
should not be protected in the same way, or to the same degree, as
property that is more healthfully constitutive of a genuine self The
question is whether the significantly ego-driven behavior of large-scale
real estate developers like Donald Trump and Mortimer Zuckerman
should be lumped together with fetishism as less deserving of legal
solicitude.
I would argue that ego, within normal boundaries, is a healthy,
natural, and powerful motivator of human activity, which the law should
recognize and even encourage. After all, ego is a source of inspiration
for the creativity and productivity of entrepreneurs, architects, artists,
scientists, explorers, and others in the commercial realm, and of parents,
children, community leaders, and others in the non-commercial realm.
Finally, it bears noting that Silverstein's relationship to the World
Trade Center may well be nothing more than that of an investor and real
estate speculator. Considered in this light, Silverstein holds little or no
personhood attachment to the property, but rather, holds it largely, if not
purely, instrumentally.
45
2. Personhood Implications for Those Who Worked On, In, and
Around the World Trade Center Site
There are a range of other stakeholders in the World Trade Center
site who hold compelling personhood attachments to the property,
including those who worked on, in, and around the towers.46
Stories abound of artisans and engineers involved in the original
construction who took pride in what they had built and speak of having
five office towers of not more than 70 stories each, located both on and off the original
parcel.
44. Radin, supra note 1, at 961.
45. But see Schroeder, supra note 14, at 108-09. In critiquing Radin's personhood
analysis, Schroeder asserts the potential for an investor's personhood attachment to
property: "This ignores the possibility that an individual property holder, such as an
investor, may subjectively value her fungible property differently from the 'objective'
social valuation of the market. Property rights may exist, in part, to protect these
subjective valuations. Indeed, the driving psychological motivation behind investment is
probably the investor's belief or hope that her Individually Subjective estimate of the
'true' value of the investment product will prove to be more accurate than the
Community Objective estimate of the market-its price.... Thus, even purely fungible
property, which is held for the realization of its eventual exchange value, is also held for
the subjective value of the investor."
46. Beyond the scope of this article are the personhood attachments, if any, of the
emergency response workers who died as a result of their efforts at the site, and the
solicitude, if any, that property law owes them.
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lost a part of themselves when the towers were destroyed. To her credit,
Radin recognizes that employees can develop personhood attachments to
a business' property, writing:
Controversies over plant closings make clear that sometimes groups
(employees, or whole communities) are "attached" in some sense to
the old holdings. These groups may represent conflicting economic
interests, desiring to maximize their profits instead of the
corporation's. But they may also represent noneconomic interests-a
noneconomic attachment to a certain )ob, a certain group of co-
workers, a certain community character.
Nevertheless, Radin contrasts this potential for an employee's
personhood attachment to a worksite with the business' own purely
instrumental valuation of its property holdings. Because business owners
are thought to consider property merely instrumentally, personhood
implications are understood to be contrary to the rational economic
impulse:
This goes for a corporation's land as well as for any other tangible
and intangible assets. Under the market ideology, we cannot think
that the corporation has become attached in some noneconomic sense
to the land or the plant it has long been using, for example.
Theoretically a corporation would sell its plant as soon as it became
cheaper to operate it somewhere else, no matter how long it had been
there. 8
3. Seemingly Unquestioned Commitment to Leave Undeveloped
the Original Footprints in Recognition of the Personhood
Attachments of Those Who Died There on September 1 th
The commitment not to redevelop the original footprints in
recognition of the personhood attachments of those who worked and died
in the World Trade Center brings us to the question of what should and
should not be commodified, and the impact of commodification on
personhood. In "Market-Inalienability, ' 49 Radin argues that certain
goods should not be treated as market goods, and should instead be
deemed unavailable for purchase and sale on the market. To fail to
recognize this is to devalue those goods and humanity more broadly.
Applying this analysis to the World Trade Center, it is clear that the
47. MARGARET JANE RAD1N, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 12-13 (1993).
48. Id. at 12-13.
49. See Radin, supra note 1 at 1903-04. See also MARGARET JANE RADIN,
CONTESTED COMMODITIES 59-60 (1996). Radin's commodification concerns are closely
related to her personhood theory.
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site was decommodified post-9/ 11 because of its rhetorical and actual
implications for personhood. Decommodification of the footprinted land
has removed from market some of the most valuable real estate in the
world,50 serving as a type of compensation for the 9/11 victims and their
survivors. Indeed, where Radin writes of "contested commodities," '5' the
original footprints have become a "contested non-commodity." Not only
has the Port Authority committed to desist from building on the
footprints, but a proposal was considered by Congress to confer national
historic landmark status on the footprinted land, prohibiting, in
perpetuity, all development of the land on which the towers stood. 2
VI. Conclusion
The law must recognize the potential impact on self-constitution of
commercial property ownership and use, especially as it relates to
eminent domain. Applying personhood theory to the commercial
property context underscores the need for a more thoughtful approach to
eminent domain law. Property subject to condemnation should be
evaluated as to the taking's impact on those holding personhood
attachments to it, whether owners or other users.
Returning to the World Trade Center example, the condemnation of
the Radio Row properties should have been tempered with an
understanding of the powerful personhood attachments of the small
business owners to their shops. This recognition might have led the
government to conclude that condemnation of these properties was not
appropriate, and that the World Trade Center developers should have
looked elsewhere to compile their parcel. Alternatively, recognition of
the personhood attachments of the Radio Row owners to their shops
might have led the government to implement a more modest
condemnation scheme, somewhere between wholesale razing and
complete immunity from eminent domain. For example, fewer
businesses could have been taken for a more modest parcel, and
substantial business relocation support could have been offered to those
whose businesses were taken. 3
50. The Port Authority's decision not to rebuild on the footprints may, in the end,
deprive Silverstein of an opportunity to rebuild all of the original office space granted
under the lease. If so, the decommodification of the land may necessitate an inverse
condemnation of the leasehold, with monetary compensation to Silverstein for his lost
property interest.
51. Radin, supra note 49, at 79-101 (discussing applications of this concept).
52. See William Neuman, Flap over National Park at WTC Site, N.Y. POST, at 6
(Nov. 17, 2003) (referring to November 2003 proposal of New York Representative
Carolyn Maloney and Connecticut Representative Christopher Shays to establish a
National Historic Site Study Commission for the World Trade Center footprints).
53. Such a result would be at variance with current eminent domain law, which does
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To suggest that a business' employees must be compensated when
the property is condemned is novel. Nevertheless, it represents a natural,
progressive extension of Radin's personhood theory, recognizing the
significant self-constitution that occurs through work, and the
substantially destabilizing effect on workers when their businesses are
relocated or closed.
not provide for payment of business relocation expenses in most instances.
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